## 12g6holc 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 ROY DEN HOLLANDER, 4 Plaintiff, 5 16 CV 9800(VSB) V. 6 KATHERINE M. BOLGER, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 New York, N.Y. 9 February 16, 2018 3:30 p.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. VERNON S. BRODERICK, 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 ROY DEN HOLLANDER, PRO SE 15 WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER, LLP 16 Attorneys for Defendants BY: JOSEPH L. FRANCOEUR 17 MICHELLE VIZZI 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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1 (Case called; in open court) THE DEPUTY CLERK: State your appearances for the 2 3 record. 4 MR. HOLLANDER: Good afternoon, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Hollander, you could just need to 5 6 speak into the microphone. So if you could just identify 7 yourself for THE record. MR. HOLLANDER: My name is Roy Den Hollander, and I am 8 9 the plaintiff. I am also an attorney admitted in this case 10 representing myself. 11 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Hollander. 12 For the defense. 13 MR. FRANCOEUR: Good afternoon, your Honor. 14 Francoeur from Wilson Elser Moskowitz for the defendants. I 15 also have my colleague, Michelle Vizzi, who has not placed an appearance in the case, but she was just admitted to this court 16 17 on --18 MS. VIZZI: Tuesday. 19 THE COURT: Welcome. You were part of the crew before 20 Judge Oetken I may have seen downstairs? 21 MS. VIZZI: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Thank you. You may be seated. 23 Now, you should feel free to remain seated or if you

want to stand and address me, that is fine. The only thing I ask again is that you speak into the microphone so that we can

make sure that the reporter gets everything down.

I put this on for oral argument in part because I think there was a request Mr. Hollander.

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes.

THE COURT: You had made a request for that. I issued an order with certain questions. We can go through those questions. Or, Mr. Hollander, some of them are directed — most of them are directed to you as plaintiff but some are directed to the defendant. Or if you already have something prepared that addresses each of the questions, that is fine also. If you want we can go one by one to see if there is anything additional — anything additional that isn't contained in your complaint I would say.

MR. HOLLANDER: I just have two preliminary points that I would like to make and then we might as well go through them question by question.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. HOLLANDER: The first point is before the papers for motion to dismiss and before your Honor's questions, I made an earlier discovery request and that early discovery request was for all the materials that the defendants took from either my iCloud or my home computer. Now, your Honor denied the request; but I think now that the issues are more defined in that some of answers to your Honor's questions actually implicate some of the mass — what I allege as the mass of

documents which they took or reproduced or copied or downloaded from my iCloud or home computer, the fact that some of the questions are implicated by that and the fact that some of the issues, I cannot -- I cannot defend on some of the issues because I don't have that information. So I would like to make a request to resubmit that motion for early discovery, which calls for everything that they copied or downloaded from my iCloud or my home computer.

So far they have they have not said — so far they have said they only got three documents, but they haven't denied the fact that they took masses of other documents. One of the reasons for that is that I have a copyright infringement allegation. Now, copyright infringement allegation can only be brought if somebody reproduces a registered copyrighted document. Now, on my iCloud and in my home computer, there is a number of copyrighted registered documents; but I cannot really make that allegation stick under the plausibility standard unless I know what they took or what they didn't take.

entitled to pre-charging or pre-complaint discovery. Here, in particular, I think you reference the copyright charge or cause of action. So let's focus on that. The basis of that is in fact the use or the alleged use by the plaintiff in some way of a copyrighted material. I am not aware of any cases that allow absent some — that allow basically sort of you to in essence

to get discovery to see whether or not they have material. While they may have possession and they haven't used it in this way, there is still no basis to assume that they necessarily do. I think your initial comment also assumes certain things that are part of the subject of some of the questions that I have.

I should say that the questions I have, and some of them may not have been artfully drafted as they could have been, really go to in essense — I am no way suggesting to the allegations of the complaint and whether or not there is support for certain of the claims that are made. In other words, claims that are made in the complaint. In other words, that where you haven't referenced a document, for example, or something like that that supports a particular claim that you are making.

Again, as things stand right now I am not going revisit my decision about the discovery issues. If during the course of this afternoon I think that your responses to the questions or the back and forth that we have changes that view, then I will revisit it. I don't see any reason to change that view or to alter the view that typically plaintiffs are not entitled to the sort of discovery in order to bolster their complaint.

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes, your Honor. May I just interject that it is not so much that they use it, it is just that if

they copied it. That means reproduce. If they reproduced any of my registered copyrighted materials on my iCloud or my home computer without my permission -- just that they are reproduced it -- that is copyright infringement action. As far cases go, there is a case called Digital Sin v Does. It is 279 F.R.D. 239, Southern District of New York. It was a copyright infringement action for downloading from the Internet a copyrighted film without the authorization of the people who produced the film and owned the copyright in the film. The Court there granted expedited discovery. In that case they granted expedited discovery to determine who actually download the material. Whereas here, what I am asking for is expedited discovery or early discover to find out what they actually downloaded or copied.

THE COURT: There are a couple questions I have. The argument that you are making assumes, I guess, that the allegations in your complaint are sufficient to demonstrate that the defendants downloaded the document in question. The affidavits that you point to or declaration actually disclaim any hacking or anything like that and they indicate that — in fact, they assert that they obtained it from the publically available website.

My question for you, number one, is with regard to the underlying basis for the claim of hacking, did you have any forensic analysis done of your computer or did you contact

Apple with regard to your iCloud to determine or request for them to determine who, if anyone, might have accessed your iCloud?

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes, your Honor. Let me just make Clear I used the phrase iCloud. ICloud is basically --

THE COURT: Are you just saying the Internet?

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes. It is an Internet service.

THE COURT: So whoever your Internet service provider is if it is not Apple or whoever it might be.

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes. I contacted the host, which was E-name Station. I contacted them twice. Basically what they told me, and what I've learned through various research, is that if somebody uses what I said in the complaint was brute force hacking. So they have a computer program and it just runs different passwords over and over against your protected Internet website and at one point it gets through. There is no way that my host had to keep a log of what computers were doing that.

In other words, you have URL computer. So it runs this program through multiple possible passwords to access the case. Now, my host did not have that. At that time -- and I believe still -- there is no law in the United States that requires what they call access logs. In Europe they have a law which requires access logs. So if any host had been in Europe, I would have had a whole list of every computer that tried,

whether successfully or not, to access my iCloud. But you don't have that here and that is what I allege.

THE COURT: The issue is what is the basis for the claim that in fact that is what happens. You haven't established through documentation that in fact this website that you say through whoever the website provider was a secured website. Because just Googling your name quite frankly you do find references to articles that have been written where other individuals who had written the articles have had access to some website that you had. I don't know what website it is or anything like it. So at some point there were certainly publically available information with regard to you. Whether it was with regard to the allegations of this other lawsuit, I have no idea. I guess what I am saying is you haven't established that you actually had an account that was in fact secure.

MR. HOLLANDER: That basically brings me to my second preliminary argument and this is a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. So your Honor seems to be asking me and in some of the questions asking me for evidence and proof of the allegations. Now, my understanding is I am not to be put on the place where I need to prove my allegations. The question is plausibility. As far as the plausibility goes, you have my sworn statement, which I am a lawyer so when I signed my first amended complaint, I swore in what was there is true. You have my

sworn statement that iCloud was protected by access codes. You have their two affidavits from two attorneys saying when they accessed the iCloud, it was public. Now, I just would like to touch upon the fact that in their affidavits --

THE COURT: Your allegation could be viewed as conclusory. In other words, they hacked it for example. Specifically with regard to your computer, I am fairly competent -- well, did you have a forensic analysis done on your computer?

MR. HOLLANDER: Well, the forensic analysis that he have done -- my understanding of a forensic analysis is going through all of my documents to see if they had been damaged or interfered with in some matter or form. So I did that myself.

There are two allegations. One is this brute force hacking, which concerns the iCloud. The other one is what is called phishing, which I receive a number of e-mails from the defendant's lawyers, they were lawyers, with attachments. I opened those attachments. In one of those attachments might have been called what is called a malware, and that would have provided information whenever I accessed my iCloud what my access codes were. So I am currently in discussion with a forensic expert on that case and as soon as he is finished with the case he is doing, I am going have him check all those attachments to see if there is phishing.

I understand on the fact that the allegations appear

conclusory or bare, I just want to bring up the point one of your questions was, when was the Google cache captured. Now, the Google cache was submitted as an exhibit by Matthew Schafer, who is one of the defendants. He said that he — first he says he accessed my iCloud for the first time on December 30th, 2014. Then he found a Google cache January 13th. Of course the document had already been submitted to the Court. He found a Google cache on January 13. The Google cache says that it was a Google cache made on January 3rd. So what that tells us is that on January 3rd, 2015, my iCloud was public.

My allegation is that they accessed my iCloud on December 30th by hacking. When they hacked into my iCloud, they stripped the access codes. It is just my allegation. If they strip the access codes on December 30th, 2014, namely, there would be a Google cache available five days later because The website would have been public. If the website had been public before December 30th, 2014, they would have gotten a Google cache from December 20th, December 25th and that would have shown that the website was public before they first accessed that. They didn't get it.

THE COURT: Going back to the point I was making about the allegations being conclusory, you're website, whoever is the provider for your -- I will refer to it as iCloud.

MR. HOLLANDER: That is how we have been doing it all

along.

THE COURT: So the iCloud that you have indicated they would be able to indicate that it was in fact password protected on X date and that on another date -- because you are saying something was striped and it seems to me that they would be able to verify that in fact something was protected in some way.

Are you saying that you never had at the time period of this lawsuit publically accessible website?

MR. HOLLANDER: No.

THE COURT: You are not saying that?

MR. HOLLANDER: No. I am saying that I have during the time of this lawsuit and the time of the prior lawsuit, which this evolved out of, the Supreme Court New York lawsuit, I never had a public website.

Now, there was a time prior to that, which goes back to the Steinberg v. Hollander case, when at that time I was trying to put together a website for a my law practice -- at that time my law practice, as it is now, I bring men's rights cases. That is basically the concentration of my law practice. For a short period, if you read through all the papers -- in the Steinberg v. Hollander case -- a website was public and it was mine, but it didn't have any of this material on it. In other words, it didn't have the media responses, which the defendants have called the media release and then the

defendants also downloaded what was called a screen shot. That wasn't there. That wasn't on that old website.

So during the time of the New York Supreme Court case and this case, I have not had any public websites. As far as what articles you have read, most of those articles I just do interviews with people.

THE COURT: Let's go through some of the questions.

The first question that deals with the protected computer, what are the allegations in the complaint that support claim that your computer was protected? Or is it just simply the basis that your computer somehow was involved or affected interstate or foreign commerce?

MR. HOLLANDER: It is what you said, the last part.

THE COURT: If it was protected, how did it do that?

MR. HOLLANDER: Well, the First Amendment complaint, just what you said. I allege that the -- I don't allege. I say that my iCloud and home computer are used for interstate commerce. Now, under the act, which is the Computer Fraud Abuse Act, it defines protected computer as meaning a computer which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication. It doesn't say anything about access codes.

THE COURT: Other than parroting the language of the statute, what are the allegations that in fact you're computer or your iCloud was utilized in that fashion?

MR. HOLLANDER: Basically I use my home computer to

contact clients. The clients may be in the United States or they may be in overseas or they may be in Russia. I have a paralegal in Slovakia, who I use my home computer to contact with. I receive materials --

THE COURT: Are those allegations in the complaint?

MR. HOLLANDER: No. I had an objection to that

question because once again we're at the point where I believe

I am being asked to prove my allegations. I will put that in

if I can amend it.

THE COURT: Well, there is a distinction. The distinction that I would draw is the following: Merely parroting the language of a statute in a complaint that that would be insufficient in order to actually carry the day for plausibility. In other words, because the computer was involved in interstate commerce without more doesn't really in my mind raise an issue that there is a plausible claim.

MR. HOLLANDER: Then I am going ask if I can amend that. My view -- yes, I make mistakes. I have made a lot of mistakes. My view is that if the definition of a protected computer is something that is used in the interstate and that is how I use my computer and I iCloud, then that fits.

There is also a case Becker v. Toka, an Eastern

District of Louisiana case, and that court held that -- it said

that the plaintiff alleged that he used the computers in

connection with his law firm business, which is what I am

alleging. The plaintiff also claimed the computers were connected to the Internet. I believe that is in there.

THE COURT: I thought you earlier said that earlier on you had had a website that was utilized in order to try to promote your law business, but this website was it --

MR. HOLLANDER: Private. Not that.

THE COURT: So I don't understand what you were just saying. In other words, if it is private and you are not using it to solicit clients and the like. In this case I assume in the allegation is that you created the document in question as something you would utilize in the litigation?

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes.

THE COURT: Again, I don't see it in the same way. I don't see if as if it were a website for your law firm or law practice.

MR. HOLLANDER: It was a website not to publicize my law firm or law practice. It was a website for repository of documents on it and also personal other information.

Why does that iCloud consist of interstate communications? Because the computer is located in Arizona. When I put my access codes to get into my iCloud, that computer I am talking to is in Scottsdale, Arizona. I am sending electronic messages to Scottsdale, Arizona.

THE COURT: You are saying the mere fact that the server is in another location is sufficient under the act to

affect interstate or foreign commerce?

MR. HOLLANDER: I believe so.

THE COURT: Let's get back to at core the issue of how you are alleging defendants got access. Am I correct the basis of your allegation is that this document was on your computer or iCloud and that it was private?

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes.

THE COURT: You cite, though, to their declarations where they indicate that — in other words, for support of that because again I could view that as a conclusory allegation without any support. There were no forensics that were done on your home computer. There was no indication from your service provider that at the time of the complaint you actually had a website that was password protected or anything of that nature.

Would you be able to actually get from your website provider a document that said at this time you had a website that was protected?

MR. HOLLANDER: No. Because that is what -- I am going to be honest with you, when I called them up, that is basically part of what I told them. I said, Look, I have a website and it's protected. And they told me, It doesn't matter whether you have access codes or not. If somebody is going to use a type of hacking, which is brute force hacking which is running through a whole bunch of passwords, we have no indication to tell if it happened where it came from. The

reason for that simply is that there was a law that was going to be passed, but it was never passed.

THE COURT: Perhaps I am not being clear.

MR. HOLLANDER: Okay.

THE COURT: Whatever your bill is that comes from your Internet provider, for example people have a G-Mail account or let's say for example Facebook, Facebook would be able to tell you I think -- although, I am not on Facebook -- what your privacy settings are. So why wouldn't your Internet service provider be able to provide the same putting aside brute force hacking and alike? They would be able to basically tell you and provide you with a document I think that supports that. Without that my view is that the allegations are conclusory.

Similarly, with regard to your computer, the basis for your claim that they actually did some accessing are their declarations or affidavits themselves but those declarations or affidavits actually state the opposite. In other words, they say that they didn't hack and that they got these from a publically available website. That is why I asked you whether you had forensics done on your computer itself.

MR. HOLLANDER: I can go back to my iCloud host and see if they are able to do that. As far as my home computer goes, I can copy -- I have the Avira firewall. I can copy that off the computer. It's on my computer. That is the firewall that protects somebody from hacking in.

THE COURT: No. The issue is, and you mentioned it yourself, in order to get access to the internal file within your commuter, one of the ways to do that I would assume is to use malware or something like that. But if your computer had malware — again, if malware was on there such that it would allow someone to get access, I would assume a forensic analysis would show that.

MR. HOLLANDER: That is what I am -- right now, and I know it is late, I have talked to this forensic expert, Matthew Peterson. I have tried to get him to do something by today but he was busy on other jobs and he I am going to specifically ask to check if there is a malware on there. Specifically check those -- I have about 10 e-mails that came from defendants with attachments and that is how the malware would have gotten in there if it is there.

As I sit here today, all I have is my sworn statement through the first amended complaint versus their sworn statements and some logic such that I talked to you about on the iCloud. I am basically countering their accusations. They say that further evidence that the iCloud was public was that it existed on the Columbia Business School alumni website. So they say that because the URL for the iCloud was on the Columbia Business School website that meant that it was public. Well, no, it doesn't mean it was public because if you clicked on the URL, it would come up "page not pound."

Now, once again it is my word versus their word. But going back to my request for everything that they took from my iCloud or home computer, if out of all those documents there is nothing from the Columbia Business School website, that means when they found it — it infers that when they found it and they clicked on it, nothing came up. Because if something had come up from my iCloud, they would have copied it down. They would have downloaded it because that is what they were looking for. Throughout the entire New York Supreme Court case over seven months they were looking for anything they could find on the Internet to use against me via ad hominem attacks in the New York Supreme Court case.

THE COURT: I don't necessarily want to get into the substance of it.

The document in question that you refer to is a document that on its face appears to be something that was outward facing. In other words, it seemed as if it were something to respond to inquiries by the media --

MR. HOLLANDER: Correct.

THE COURT: -- and not for necessarily use in connection with the litigation. In other words, you claim it is work product.

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes.

THE COURT: And I haven't thought this through, but just because you're a lawyer and you have a lawsuit doesn't

necessarily mean that everything you do is work product.

MR. HOLLANDER: Correct.

THE COURT: I also don't know how the fact that you are pro se in that case and this case how that implicates that issue.

Let me just ask this, because I will tell you that on the basis of the allegations in the complaint that I was prepared to dismiss your complaint today. If what you are telling me that you believe you can add facts and the facts specifically relating to -- again, I don't know who your service provider is but to the extent that you have a service provider and you can get the information that basically shows that during this time period you had a website and that that website -- I don't know what it would -- that you had a website or a cloud or some sort of storage on the Internet that was protected. In other words, that no other individuals could access. That would be something that you would rely on in connection with your complaint. In other words, it would be an attachment to your complaint.

Similarly if what you are saying a forensic analysis of your computer would show there was malware on there and that that malware was put on the computer at or around the time that — let me put it this way: My view is that would be the only way that I think you would be able to substantiate again those basic allegations in your complaint. That is putting

aside the issue of some of the legal claims that you have. We're talking about the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act now.

MR. HOLLANDER: Right.

THE COURT: There are other legal problems that I see with some of your other claims in the complaint, for example, the RICO claim. My understanding is the predicate acts that you refer to are one is wire fraud. I understand that. The other is robbery. The New York statute that you refer to is not robbery. When you look at the generic definition of robbery, it doesn't encompass the -- I apologize. I think it is Section 150.

MR. HOLLANDER: Theft of computer. It doesn't include force.

THE COURT: That's correct. At core robbery involves some physical use of force or threated use of force. That is not present in that statute. In fact, there are separate statutes for robbery and the theft from a computer. While I understand the legal argument you are trying to make the connection, absent a New York court interpreting that statute to be akin to robbery, the elements are different between robbery and the generic robbery which either generic robbery as under federal law or robbery as defined under New York State law. So I don't think there is a predicate act sufficient. Putting aside the wire fraud count, I don't think there is a sustainable RICO charge here. That is without going to the

issue of whether there is an enterprise --

MR. HOLLANDER: Sure.

THE COURT: -- and the like.

MR. HOLLANDER: On the robbery, RICO talks about the -- RICO lists a number of predicate acts. One of them is robbery. Now, according to the Second Circuit court in a case United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1986), when you try to determine the definition of robbery or those other predicate acts they are generic definitions. They are not dependent upon what a state law may say. Because if they are dependent upon what a state law may say, in one state you may have a RICO predicate act but because the state law is different in the second state, you won't have a predicate act. That is why the Courts have said -- not only the Second Circuit but also the Third Circuit -- that in order to determine whether the predicate act as defined in the RICO statute fits with something in the state, it is a generic definition.

So robbery while in New York State requires force, under the federal law a lesser included offense of robbery is theft. Simple theft under federal law 18, U.S.C., Section 2111 is a lesser offense of the federal offense of robbery. There is an Eighth Circuit Case, United States v. Walking Crow, 560 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1977). My argument is since theft, which is specifically mentioned in that New York Penal Law, says theft of computer material is a lesser included offense under federal

law of robbery that that would fit with the federal generic definition of robbery in the RICO listing of predicate acts.

THE COURT: I understand the argument; but if it is lesser included, it means that it is missing an element and it is missing an element of robbery. So under Model Penal Code a person is guilty of robbery in the course of committing a theft if he, A, inflicts serious bodily injury upon another, or B, threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury. So you have both either the threat of bodily injury. So it is not just the theft, it's that additional element that is totally missing. Just by its very definition, a lesser included offense is not the offense; right? It a lesser included offense for a reason and that is because it is missing a critical element here. So it wouldn't be robbery. It would be something else.

MR. HOLLANDER: My position is that -- my understanding of it is whatever the state says an extortion is or murder is, that doesn't matter. What matters is what the RICO statute says extortion or murder are. I cite in my papers United States v. Forsythe, 567 F2d 1127, Third Circuit. There it said That Congress's intent when it passed a RICO statute was to show that the predicate act inquiry is not the manner in which states classify their criminal prohibitions, which here was robbery, but whether the particular state involved prohibits the activity involved. The activity involved that I

am alleging is theft of computer material. So while, yes, what happened here doesn't -- I couldn't go to the D.A. here and say, They robbed my material here in New York, but my view is that a generic federal definition of that predicate act of robbery is included here as theft of computer material.

THE COURT: I think that is deficient. Again, I would dismiss the RICO cause of action on that basis. Having said that, I would give you a limited amount of time because all of these claims hinge upon your claim that somehow there was hacking or something like that.

MR. HOLLANDER: Okay.

THE COURT: As I mentioned coming in today, in my view the allegations in your complaint were conclusory with regard to that and that the information that you relied upon to buttress your complaint, in other words the declarations or affidavits of the defendants in the prior case, didn't support the claim of hacking and actually were inconsistent with that. So as I mention I was prepared to dismiss the complaint on that basis.

I will tell you this, though, if the information comes back from your service provider that in fact you had a public website, that is going to be a problem for you.

MR. HOLLANDER: No. If it comes back that way, I will tell you the case is done. And if I talked to them once, I talked to them twice. My Internet service provider says, Look,

we went through all our computers and they say your website was public at that time, then this case is gone and I am not going to bother appealing it.

THE COURT: What I am saying to you is this: I am not making a ruling right now, but that piece of information is something that you would be acutely aware of at the time. So by putting in the complaint -- and I know you said it is sworn to and while you are an attorney --

MR. HOLLANDER: Right.

THE COURT: -- the complaint itself is not your sworn statement.

MR. HOLLANDER: I will swear right now that that to the best of my knowledge -- I mean, that iCloud was protected by access codes until it was broken into and the access codes were stripped. I already said that on January 3rd when that Google cache came out that at that point in time that iCloud was public. The only way it would have been public was that the access codes at some time before that had been stripped. That is my firm understanding and belief.

Now, I am not a computer expert and I don't know what kind of strange things happen with computers, but that is my view. Otherwise I wouldn't have brought this case. It would have made no sense. Why should I waste everybody's time, energy and effort including mine?

THE COURT: Well, that's not a question for today.

What I am saying to you, and I want to be clear, is that if the information, either one or both on forensics, comes back and shows there is no malware on your computer — and the other thing is I am assuming that you have had the same computer.

In other words, you have had the same computer from the date that you filed — in other words, this is the same computer you had when you had the state court action.

MR. HOLLANDER: Okay. The computer back then that was connected to the Internet is different than the computer I have now. In order -- my understanding to determine whether there is malware is I still have the e-mails with the attachments that came from the defendants. So that is what the forensic expert is going to look at. There may or may not be malware in there. I always said in my complaint iCloud or home computer. The only reason I said that is because those are the only two places where the document, media responses and the screen shot existed. So I said iCloud or that.

Now, there may or may not be malware there. I don't know. I will have him check. And then I will also go back to my website host. I know I asked them this about two years ago can you tell what was going on and what the status was and back then they said, No, they couldn't.

THE COURT: Do you still have that old computer?

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes.

THE COURT: Here is the issue: You are bringing a

lawsuit based upon what may or may not have been done with your computer and your iCloud.

MR. HOLLANDER: Right.

THE COURT: I don't know both as a legal matter or as a matter of forensics the fact that you now have a different computer whether that necessarily makes a difference. The bottom line is the evidence that an argument would be made to preserve the computer itself. So I don't know if you still have that computer and it still has the information on it and you just don't use it anymore, or whether you stripped everything off of that and it has been wiped clean.

MR. HOLLANDER: No. What was on there in the past is probably still there. I will ask the guy to look at both. I will ask him to look at the e-mails in my computers.

THE COURT: Again, I have not gone through because there are issues with regard to some of the other claims that you brought. I have spoken about the RICO claim.

MR. HOLLANDER: Right. Could I touch upon the copyright again?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOLLANDER: Let's assume --

THE COURT: Do you have a copyright on this document?

MR. HOLLANDER: No. On the media -- this goes back to the discovery stuff. So the media response is there is no copyright on it.

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1 THE COURT: Just to be clear --2 MR. HOLLANDER: No registered copyright. 3 THE COURT: No registered copyright on the media. 4 MR. HOLLANDER: On the media responses. 5 Now, there was an Exhibit 1 from Schafer, which was a screen shot. Now, that screen shot -- most of that screen shot 6 7 is registered, and I have that here. The screen shot was a small bit of information, but that bit of information had been 8 9 registered back with the -- this had been registered as when I 10 was -- remember, I mentioned the fact that I was trying to --11 THE COURT: Do you have a copy for your adversary? 12 MR. HOLLANDER: No, I don't. I am sorry. 13 The data that was on the screen shot was registered 14 with that particular website. I can show what was included in 15 that registration. 16 THE COURT: Again, am I correct that the basis of the 17 claim, putting aside the --MR. HOLLANDER: The one screen shot? 18 19 THE COURT: No. Putting aside the responses to media 20 document, the basis for this claim would be your suspicion that 21 other things may have been copied? 22 MR. HOLLANDER: No. I will show this to him. 23 Exhibit 1 of the screen shot of Schafer. That one Defendant 24 Schafer in his affidavit said he copied that on December 30th,

2014, when he first copied the December 30th, 2014 -- when he

first accessed the iCloud.

Now, what you are holding in your hand is the registration statement that includes this material. You can see -- if I can come up there and bring it to your Honor. This is the screen shot and this is some of the material that was registered under that copyright registration. It's not much.

THE COURT: The question is the website here that is listed is RoyDenHollander.com.

MR. HOLLANDER: Right.

THE COURT: The website that the defendants are alleged to have accessed is something different.

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes. The screen shot that they took from my iCloud — the manner, the wording, the phrasing is identical to some of the phrasing that was previously registered under RoyDenHollander.com.

THE COURT: This website, MensRightslaw.net, is that a website that you maintain?

MR. HOLLANDER: That is part of the iCloud. It has a -- see, it started with my basically trying to set up a lawyer website, RoyDenHollander.com. That was years ago. That was only public for a short period of time. Then it evolved into -- when I started doing a lot of men's rights cases, it involved into men's rights cases. So I included that stuff in the iCloud, but it wasn't public. Then it evolved into using this thing as a iCloud. So I had this website that went

through a transition period and it ended up just holding a whole bunch of disparate, different materials. Now, among one of the materials it held was this men's rights stuff, which I was thinking to putting together at some point in time.

THE COURT: Do you concede that this screen shot is a screen shot of website that you had at the time, whether it was public or private?

MR. HOLLANDER: The screen shot was taken when everything was private. And some of the phraseology in that screen shot, some of the sentences are identical to what was registered under the RoyDenHollander.com website. I say that RoyDenHollander.com website was — some of it when it was being created was public at that particular point in time because I was creating it. Now, that kind of segues me into the other materials.

THE COURT: With regard to the document at issue again, the responses to media, there is no copyright for that; right?

MR. HOLLANDER: No. It was not registered with the Copyright Office because it is attorney work product. In my view it was attorney work product of the I am not going register attorney work product with Copyright Office.

THE COURT: When you say it is "attorney work product," again what is the basis for that statement, that you're an attorney and you created it?

MR. HOLLANDER: No. It was created in the course of litigation for that litigation. I brought — up to that point in time I had a number of these men's rights cases and a lot of times I am contacted by the media. So what I would do is put together a document with — just, you know, anything that came into my head. No matter how far out to the left or to right, I just put it into that document and in case I got contacted by the media. Sometimes I use it. Sometimes I wouldn't.

In this case I was never contacted by media, but that is why I created that document because I was in litigation. My view was that communications to the media when you are litigating a case has some -- can have some impact on a case. There can be some involvement there. So I considered it as an attorney work product for that reason.

THE COURT: That type of material, the type of material that the document contained, isn't it more akin to something a public relations firm might do? It didn't inform, am I correct, and it wasn't your legal impressions or legal analysis of the case itself? And, in fact, you were intending to share with others and one of the things that work product is that it's not something that you would share with others.

MR. HOLLANDER: It never was shared with others. And also in that document there is some of the legaleses in simpler language as to what this case is about. Whenever I was contacted by the media for any of my other cases, they want to

know, okay, what is this about. So I tried to put it in simple language, the legalese. Yes, if I had been contacted by the media, I may have used that. I may not. So it was just something there to put my thoughts down in that situation.

THE COURT: With regard to the copyright and the specific documents that we — the responses to media, since there isn't a valid copyright for it, how can you sustain a copyright claim with regard to it?

MR. HOLLANDER: You can't sustain a copyright infringement claim for that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HOLLANDER: Now, I have that screen shot and my belief is under the law I can sustain a copyright infringement claim for that small screen shot you have.

THE COURT: Those allegations, the allegations that you just recounted -- and again I am not in any way saying that they would pass muster -- those allegations are not in your complaint.

MR. HOLLANDER: Okay. Can I then go to why I consider this -- the mass material that they took from my iCloud and home computer so important?

THE COURT: Well, okay.

MR. HOLLANDER: Let's assume my iCloud was public. My iCloud is public. They went in there and they copied these other matters, which are registered with the Copyright Office.

That is an infringement. Even if my iCloud was public, that is the infringement. There is plenty of case law for the fact that just because somebody puts something up on the Internet, it does not mean it has been published. See, publication under copyright law has a specific meaning.

THE COURT: If you have a public website and you are allowing people to copy the materials on your website, I fail to see how you would be able to sustain a copyright action in particular when there are no allegations, A, that any other documents — that the defendants were in possession of any other documents.

MR. HOLLANDER: On information and belief, your Honor. There is plenty of that in my complaint.

THE COURT: Information and belief does not mean you can just guess. As I understand it -- you can correct me if I am wrong -- the logic behind it is all based upon the pillar that they improperly accessed and got access to the responses to media documents and therefore you then say on information and belief they got access to other documents and downloaded them.

MR. HOLLANDER: Yeah. You are allowed to under the plausibility standard -- there are a couple of cases where it allows you to bring information and belief allegations when they have the information. They still refuse to say whether they copied anything else other than what you have there as the

screen shot and media responses. They refuse to say, No, we didn't copy anything else. So that information they know. I don't know.

THE COURT: Let's say they put in an affidavit saying the only document that they ever had was this responses to media document.

MR. HOLLANDER: If they put in an affidavit, I will believe it. But they haven't said — this case has been going on for a while and the other case under that motion before the New York Supreme Court was some years ago. They have not said one way or another. They haven't put in an affidavit. They could have put in an affidavit. They could have walked in here with an affidavit and the argument would have been gone.

THE COURT: I will hand this back to you.

Let me just state that the document that has copyright on it doesn't indicate with any sort of specificity what the purported copyrighted material is. I guess what I would say to you, Mr. Hollander, as stated I would dismiss the copyright claim based upon the current allegations in the complaint.

MR. HOLLANDER: Could I add one thing?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOLLANDER: Let's assume the iCloud is public. I assume that. Assume that. If they copied a registered copyrighted docket from a public iCloud, that is infringement under the Copyright Act because publication -- putting

something public on the Internet does not give them -- no, I have to go back.

Just because something is public on the Internet doesn't mean there is a publication. If I have a document, a book and it is published, publication and I give it to your Honor and sell it to your Honor --

THE COURT: But if they don't use it for anything.

MR. HOLLANDER: All they have to do is reproduce. It is reproduce, distribute, display. All they have to do is copy.

THE COURT: First of all, there is no evidence that they have gotten any other documents.

MR. HOLLANDER: Correct.

THE COURT: There is no evidence that they have reproduced anything in any way, shape or form.

MR. HOLLANDER: That is why I asked for early discovery.

THE COURT: No. In copyright claims typically there is an assertion that the photo appeared in a magazine or the excerpt of a book appeared -- somebody copied it and it appeared somewhere else. You are not entitled to get discovery. The case that you mentioned there was already it sounded -- again, I haven't looked at it -- as if there had been a determination that the movie had been downloaded and the issue there was who did the downloading and what use was it put

to. Here there aren't any allegations. Again, with regard to this other tranche of documents that you are now claiming — again, I am not changing my prior ruling with regard to discovery because I don't believe that type of discovery would be warranted in this case. In other words, the discovery to attempt to not even bolster. It is an attempt to actually — well, someone might describe it as the classic fishing expedition. In other words, you don't have a claim and so you need to produce discovery to substantiate it.

Now, I don't know what the specific allegations -- I don't have the allegations that you would include that you claim would support this copyright claim with regard to this other material, but it is fair to say with regard to the document that is at issue here there is no copyright claim.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  HOLLANDER: On media response there was on that small document you looked at.

Your Honor, you have a situation -- I mean, this situation in the New York court, I mean, you really had the classic political divide here. Me the Trump supporter. They are the political correct. So there was a lot of animosity. Somehow they get into my iCloud. Logic tells me, but maybe logic doesn't matter, they are going to take everything. But if they have more than what this is or -- once again, they haven't said one way or another whether they have taken more or not; but if they took everything, they got me by the throat.

If they took everything, they got me by the throat. They can destroy my business easily with all that. You take it out of context and you spin it around and that is.

THE COURT: Isn't that some future lawsuit? They haven't used it. Assuming everything you said is correct, that they downloaded it and that they are lying in wait, they haven't done anything with it. In fact, they may never — let's assume — do anything with it. It is just sitting somewhere. Again, I am accepting it for purposes of the argument here. In my mind you haven't stated a claim. In other words, it is not ripe. Again assuming all those facts, it wouldn't be ripe.

MR. HOLLANDER: I gotcha. When it happens, I hope you are the judge on the case.

THE COURT: Well, let me just ask this: Before I send you off to amend the complaint with regard to the copyright, as I mention assuming you could show that this material is copyrighted and arguably they may have had access to it on this website -- I think it would have to be on the .net website, not the .com website because my understanding of that is that predated the .net website. And, in fact, the .com website may have been the website you were utilizing in connection with your law practice.

Assuming you are able to substantiate that. Since there is no use at least in my view, there isn't a ripe claim

here. Again, that is without establishing that there is some proof that they in fact downloaded the material. It just shows that you had certain copyrighted materials at or around the time of the prior state case.

MR. HOLLANDER: Okay. We just disagree on the law there. My understanding is if somebody copies it, then it infringes. That is a disagreement on the law.

THE COURT: Again, what I am going to do is -
MR. FRANCOEUR: Your Honor, if I could be heard before
you make a ruling.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Just a few minutes.

Your Honor, I appreciate you have not made a ruling on whether or not to give plaintiff a right to amend. I would suggest to, your Honor, there are two reasons why you should not. The first one is that even if the plaintiff went back and got what is glaringly and obviously missing from the complaint and that there was some evidence that the website was private, collateral estoppel bars these claims. All the claims that we have in this action is that there has been hacking of a private website and that then there was improper use of the document, the media release, was all previously litigated.

THE COURT: I know that these issues were raised in the prior litigation. However, wasn't that case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds?

MR. FRANCOEUR: No, your Honor. There was a one-sentence decision that said, There is no basis for the relief sought, and I suspect that the Court had the same reaction to the logic arguments that you are having. While I like logic and I like logic games, in the pleading logic is a problem. Because in a pleading logic means on unsupported conclusory allegation. There is case law that is legion that says that is not enough.

There is a second reason, your Honor. The plaintiff needs to show for a computer fraud claim damages.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FRANCOEUR: There is no showing whatsoever about damages. There are five cases that I cite that give five specific reasons why the complaint as pledged shows no damages. Plaintiff has said there is no third-party vendors that have come in and done an analysis. He spent many some time looking it. He spent some time researching. He spent some time taking prophylactic measures to prevent future attacks.

In 30 seconds I can read you these five quote, and then I will be quite. "Losses relating to time and effort in assessing damage are not within the scope of damage for computer fraud claims." That is the *Think v. Time Warner Cable* case at 810 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y 2011).

My second quote: "Loss is incurred from instituting prophylactic security measures against some potential future

offense are not recoverable." *Rice Inc. v. Lennar Corp.*, 15 CV 7905 2016 WL 372736 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

My third of five: "Plaintiff concedes that copying data does not constitute damage for the purposes of a computer fraud act." Oh, I am sorry. That is in the plaintiff's own opposition at page 21.

Fourth point: "Accessing a publically available website cannot form the basis of a CFAA claim." That is Orbit One v. Numerex, 692 F. Supp 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

Finally, you have the old American rule, which I think comes in here, if the plaintiff has taken some time to analyze the damages and see what has happened here, those are litigation costs. In *McGuire v. Russell*, Second Circuit, 1 F.3d 1306 in 1993 said, "In federal practice the general rule, sometimes called the American rule, is that each party bears its own fees unless fee shifting is permitted by contract of statute," which it is not.

THE COURT: In other words, the investigation that had gone into preparing the complaint, which is I think in essence what you are saying that done by here the plaintiff himself. I understand the issue with regard to the damages. However — and this is a big if — if through the forensic analysis there is some costs associated with that that demonstrates that — again, everything has to line up. By that I mean the computers, the timing and the malware at the time. I think

there is more of an argument he has expended -- that there has been damage to the computer itself. And I agree with you that as the complaint stands now, it doesn't sufficiently allege damages.

MR. FRANCOEUR: My point is even if he comes back with the computer service provider saying it was locked, the amendment is not going to cure the lack of damages.

THE COURT: I am not prejudging the issue with regard to the iCloud issue, but I think with regard to the computer itself to the extent there was malware and malware found on it and the forensic analysis bears that out, I think that at least at this stage, the pleading stage, that would be sufficient.

Having said that, let me go back to a point I made earlier, Mr. Hollander. When you go and you have this analysis done, I am going to hear from defendants with regard to —because as they have indicated in their papers, they believe this lawsuit is pure harassment plain and simple. I am not opining on that one way or another, but I will say that if one were to look at the history of things, I understand the argument that they are making. So I am not precluding them from if we go down this path and you amend your complaint and the information comes out that doesn't support the allegation that the defendants hacked into your computer or that they improperly accessed your iCloud, I will hear from them with regard to what if any remedies they would like to take with

regard to that.

Again, I am not ruling any Rule 11 motion is something that I would grant or not, but I am saying that is within the ambit of what my consideration would be. So as you go through these steps, I want to be clear that that is something that I am not precluding and I wouldn't preclude them from making such a motion to seek costs in connection with responding to this litigation.

MR. HOLLANDER: Fine. I assume what will happen is they will seek costs under the Copyright Act and I will just use that screen shot.

I want to go back to two of the other questions.

THE COURT: Let's separate that out. There are costs, yes, that the copyright statute can provide with attorney fees. I am talking about something separate and apart from that, which is Rule 11 of the the Rules of Civil Procedure, which they can pursue also.

MR. HOLLANDER: Okay.

THE COURT: So I am not limiting it to a particular statute, in other words, to the copyright statute that they prevail and therefore they should be entitled to get attorney fees.

MR. HOLLANDER: So it would be another case or whatever. Fine.

I just and want to go back to two points. You started

to raise the point that -- well, the New York Supreme Court was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion to withdraw the document was simply denied. Basically two sentences, denied and no basis for it. So the motion to withdraw the document, which was the media responses, the Supreme Court case said denied. The entire case -- the merits of the case was dismissed on personal jurisdiction. You read through the order from Justice Schecter. It is all about personal jurisdiction.

Now back to damages. Defense counsel confusions damages with losses. Damages under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1030(e)(8). That is damages. That is when the computer or data somebody corrupts.

THE COURT: Yes. The document is corrupted or -MR. HOLLANDER: That is damages. Losses is what I
allege. The term losses under 18, U.S.C., 1030(e)(11) -- the
term losses means any reasonable cost to any victim including
the cost responding to an offense; conducting the damage
assessment, which is what an investigation; losses in time and
expenses and analyzing; investigating security of the computer;
modifying computers to prevent further unauthorized access and
otherwise responding to the intrusion. That is losses. I have
nine cases. He has five cases.

THE COURT: The question I have, and I haven't looked at this, but don't you only get to losses to the extent you are

able to sufficiently allege damages? In other words, that you have been statutorily damaged under a particular statute.

MR. HOLLANDER: Navistar, Inc. v. New Baltimore Garage Inc., 2012 WL 4338816 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2012). Even if the alleged offense ultimately is found to have caused no damage to the computer, no damage to the data, no damage to the databases or interruption of service, losses still apply.

First Rate Mortgage Corp. v. Vision Mortgage Services
Corporate, 211 WL 666--

THE COURT: Well, I am going to cut it off. I understand the argument with regard that plaintiff should be estopped. My reading from the decision of the state court is that the basis was jurisdictional. Even if I could read into that the judge somehow touched on the merits of the underlying claims, it seemed to me that that was more in the realm of dicta.

Having said that, I am making a rule on the RICO claim. The RICO claim is out.

MR. HOLLANDER: Okay.

THE COURT: I am making a rule on the copyright claim. The copyright as it currently stands is out.

Mr. Hollander, if you think there is some allegations that you think that can pass muster, although, again without having any allegations that relate to use or distribution of these things, that again you'll have to make the connection

that somehow that they copied the materials, I will allow you to try and do that. As it stands right now, the copyright infringement claim is out as it relates to the document in question.

MR. HOLLANDER: Fine.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Judge, can I clarify something I said about the collateral estoppel?

THE COURT: Yes. What I will say with regard to the collateral estoppel, I am giving you my preliminary analysis. I am not ultimately ruling on that now.

Go ahead.

MR. FRANCOEUR: It is all clearly laid out in the papers. The action may have been disposed of on jurisdictional grounds, but the issue of the hack was decided in a sanctions motion which was denied and in a separate motion which was specific to the hack. The action was resolved on a different basis.

THE COURT: Replevin, did you ever ask for the document back?

MR. HOLLANDER: Yes. It was my notice of —— it was in the New York Supreme Court. It was my notice of motion for withdrawal of what we have been calling media responses and that was made January 23rd, 2015. I said that defendants turned over to me all paper and digital copies of any of Exhibit 2, which was the media responses, and any other

material obtained in the same manner that they are in possession or control of.

THE COURT: How is it that you have superior right to the defendants with regard to this? It is not copyrighted; right?

MR. HOLLANDER: It is not copyright. The replevin -- well, basically it is my property.

THE COURT: You have to --

MR. HOLLANDER: I mean, as between someone who takes your -- makes a copy of your property without your authorization and you -- I would say I or you have the superior possessory right.

THE COURT: Again, it is based upon this idea that it wasn't a public website because they didn't have access to it. It certainly can't be based on copyright because the document was not copyrighted.

MR. HOLLANDER: Right.

THE COURT: I am pointing out to you issues I believe that to the extent you can, you would need to address that in any subsequent pleading. In addition, you made that request but was there an actual refusal to return it?

MR. HOLLANDER: Sorry?

THE COURT: Refusal to return the document?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  HOLLANDER: I made the request and there was no refusal that I can recall.

THE COURT: Now, with regard to the trespass to chattels, is there any allegation in the complaint that the defendants intended to interfere with your possession of the particular document and that there was a harm that resulted from that?

MR. HOLLANDER: For instance, yeah, the media responses, but this goes back. So my allegation is media responses was an attorney work product.

THE COURT: You still had it?

MR. HOLLANDER: I still have -- see, that goes back. We're getting back to the computer fraud piece. I still had that document, but because they made what I allege as an attorney work product public, it destroyed its value. I mean, if you have an attorney work product and your opponent gets ahold of it and they use it, which they did in the New York Supreme Court case, whatever value that document may have had is gone.

THE COURT: How is the use, A, diminished by using it in a litigation? As I understand it, the documents provide information. I don't know what value necessarily it would have. What I will say is this: In connection with whatever amendment you are going to do, as I understand in order for the defendants to be liable, the defendants would have to have harmed the material value or material interests in the physical condition of the document, the quality or the value of the

chattel, which I hear is the document. Again, I don't believe that you sufficiently allege that in the current complaint.

They haven't deprived you of the value of the document because you still have the document. It is not clear to me exactly what value the document necessarily has and if there is such a value how the defendants have somehow diminish that value of that particular document.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Judge, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FRANCOEUR: I am going to refer the Court to the papers but we have cases on here that say these trespass to chattel claims, replevin, they are covered under the Copyright Act and they are not appropriate. The Second Circuit has spoken in *Miller v. Hallbrook*, 377 Fed. Appx. 72 (2d Cir. 2010). It was preempted by the Copyright Act.

MR. HOLLANDER: I would like to respond twice.

Well, I had an attorney work product. The key to the attorney work product is kept quiet. It is considered the sanctity of an attorney's thought. So in the argument before the New York Supreme Court, Defendant Bolger focused on this document, and once again it brings up the ad hominem attacks and the split in this country between, shall we say,

Trump-ites -- although, I wasn't a Trump-ite then -- and people who then would have been Obama and Clinton. She focused on the document to exploit that political split. I believe it

succeeded. The point was it was an attorney work product and she made it public and she used it in the case.

Now, as far as preemption goes, defense counsel doesn't really have the preempt change requirement correct. Preemption does not apply when the state action comes within the subject matter of copyright and -- this is the key part -- the state action -- the state action claims -- the state actions claims --

THE COURT: What is the additional element?

MR. HOLLANDER: That is what I am going to.

THE COURT: What is the additional element?

MR. HOLLANDER: It is that the state action claims may proceed when those claims contain extra elements that may -- or what is the extra element here?

THE COURT: Exactly.

MR. HOLLANDER: The extra element here is copyright protects rights to produce, perform, distribute and display not to possess. The trespass is an action concerning possession — the right of possession.

THE COURT: Well, I think it is clear that the core of your claim here is the unauthorized publication of the document in question and that the right therefore that you are seeking to enforce appears to be coextensive, at least in my view, with the Copyright Act for purposes of the trespass to chattel and replevin claims.

Putting aside again the other legal issues with deficiencies that I have pointed out there. So with regard to the  $\--$ 

MR. HOLLANDER: Could I just add one point?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOLLANDER: In his papers he raises preemption as to replevin. He doesn't raise it in his papers as the trespass. My argument against preemption with respect to replevin is that New York CPLR 701 specifically provides for a recovery of chattel through a replevin action. You can even use the sheriff to recover that chattel. That doesn't exist in the Copyright Act. And when we're talking about replevin, it is copies that they have of my material being returned to me. I am unaware that anywhere in a Copyright Act it has that. I guess you can bring a copyright claim and you can ask for a preliminary injunction or injunction.

THE COURT: They never refused to return it; right?

MR. HOLLANDER: That's interesting. That's right. We got to that point. Can I ask them now?

THE COURT: If they will return the document?

MR. HOLLANDER: Yeah. I will ask them now.

MR. FRANCOEUR: It is preempted, your Honor.

THE COURT: It's what?

MR. HOLLANDER: It's preempted he said.

THE COURT: Look, as things stand now as I mentioned,

the New York State claims for replevin and trespass to chattels are out for the reasons I have specified. I will provide a more detailed explanation if need be at a future date.

With regard to the injurious falsehood --

MR. HOLLANDER: Oh, I am withdrawing that. Statute of limitations problems. Forget it. It is gone.

THE COURT: Isn't your professional Conduct 4.1 claim -- assuming you can bring such a claim -- isn't that based upon this idea of somehow it is an injurious falsehood?

Just factually the document is referred to. It's identified in the papers of the state as responses to media. It is then defined as release. There are only two places that I was able to find where it was called media release.

Why is that somehow a falsehood? I assume that it is somehow something more than just a mere description of a party in a litigation. How does that not only make a false statement a fact to a third person?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  HOLLANDER: Can you tell me which of your questions that is under?

THE COURT: Well, I am going through the rules of conduct.

MR. HOLLANDER: You did. You asked why does the characterization -- I am looking for the question -- why would the characterization of the documents --

THE COURT: Hold on. I can find that for you.

1	MR. HOLLANDER: It is under RICO. Plaintiff's
2	memorandum
3	THE COURT: The question is: To the extent that you
4	could necessarily even have a claim under the professional
5	responsibility against these attorneys, what are the
6	allegations that support that either lawyer made a false
7	statement of fact or law to a third person in the state case?
8	MR. HOLLANDER: I am asking the Court to refer them to
9	professional responsibility committee for essentially making
10	intentionally making a false statement of fact. It is based
11	upon the fact that the media responses was introduced in
12	Defendant Bolger's affirmation. In that affirmation, she
13	stated on page 1, Exhibit 1, and under that affirmation she
14	swore a true and correct copy of the media release. That is
15	important. Media release available at plaintiff's iCloud is
16	attached hereto as Exhibit 1. So she and introduced the
17	document as a media release when it is not a media release.
18	THE COURT: The document itself was not doctored;
19	right?
20	MR. HOLLANDER: No. The document wasn't doctored.
21	THE COURT: The title itself was plain for the judge
22	to see; right?
23	MR. HOLLANDER: The judge could see the title.
21	THE COURT. The namers that were filed in other places

actually identified the document by name; right?

MR. HOLLANDER: No. No. Let me finish it.

Affirmation calls it a media release. In her memorandum of law at page 5 -- it is in my first amended complaint Exhibit E -- she noted that the product -- that the title of the document was responses to media. She noted that the -- that is the one and only time -- let me finish. She cited to it. She made a shorthand citation. We put the parens and we put the quotes in.

THE COURT: Release.

MR. HOLLANDER: She called it media release.

THE COURT: No. I think it was defined as release.

MR. HOLLANDER: Okay. Release.

THE COURT: It actually doesn't matter.

MR. HOLLANDER: Nine times.

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter. A party in a litigation, whether it is a memo of law or otherwise, having appropriately identified the document by its actual title and then defines it as release, I don't view that then subsequently the mentioning of it as release as a falsehood. That's number one.

Number two, the premise that without altering the document, the mere fact that at two places the defendants, whether it is in their affirmations or in the memo of law, may have referred to media release, I find that is not sufficient to meet the falsehood that would be necessary for an attorney

to violate the New York Law of Professional Conduct 4.1.

MR. HOLLANDER: I disagree.

THE COURT: By extension if I were to rule otherwise,
A, any litigant who defines a document in a way that their
adversary doesn't believe -- in other words, defines it. In
other words, identifies it correctly and then defines it in a
way that somehow the adversary would view as not the best way
of defining it would be sufficient. Here it has to be
something that is false. Putting aside the fact that this was
before the state court judge, in other words, the idea that if
it was something that was so blatant and such a falsehood
and -- again, this is not necessarily critical to my ruling -the state court judge would have called it the lawyers out on
it. In other words, when you are talking about a violation of
4.1, that is akin to basically a lawyer lying to a judge.

MR. HOLLANDER: That is what I saw it as.

THE COURT: Here again -- I will provide additional details -- it simply does not meet the criteria for any kind of referral. To the extent that you were alleging that it could also be somehow a substantive claim, I would dismiss it on that basis only because I believe you were just asking me to refer --

MR. HOLLANDER: Just that. I didn't bring it as a substantive --

THE COURT: Based on the allegations as I understand

them and what I have already indicated, I would decline to do that. I simply find that there is no basis to conclude that the attorneys were knowingly making false statements of law to the state court judge or fact to the state court judge as to the description of that document.

MR. HOLLANDER: I saw that as a fact that she was experienced in the media as her attorney mentions and the fact that your typical press release is only 600, 800 words. Okay.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Your Honor, can I make a brief point?
THE COURT: Yes.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  FRANCOEUR: I know you have reserved judgment on the --

THE COURT: Collateral estoppel.

MR. FRANCOEUR: -- collateral estoppel, but I would like to make a brief point. I told myself I didn't want to belabor the point about vexatious litigation, but I would like to make a very brief point. My clients are here in the courtroom. This is a painful --

THE COURT: I saw some shaking heads back there and I figured they were people who might have an interest.

Go ahead.

MR. FRANCOEUR: It is hard to listen to. There is a lot of serious allegations. There is no merit. There is no basis. The closest we came was logic. I just ask the Court to keep in mind these are people, these are lives with

reputations. It is very hard for them. There are claims being withdrawn it seems almost flippantly. It doesn't matter to the plaintiff, but it matters tremendously to the people on it defense and I ask that the Court to keep that in mind.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. FRANCOEUR: I appreciate you letting me say that.

THE COURT: In all litigations, in particularly when you are involving attorneys and alleging that the attorneys' conduct in a prior litigation was somehow arguably -- I guess the allegation with regard to 4.1 was sanctionable in essence. I understand the issues with regard to the defendants and their profession.

MR. HOLLANDER: Your Honor, may I say something?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOLLANDER: I am 70 years old. I am going to be 71 in September. How do I get by? I get by doing the lowest of lowest of legal work called document review. One reason I am doing that document review is because of their defendants back there and their litigation of personal destruction, including Mr. Francoeur and his litigation of personal destruction.

The first -- the second letter he sends to your Honor, he brings in all this irrelevant stuff in support, which I can see now didn't work to bias the Court. That is what I went through in the New York Supreme Court. Nothing but

allegations, ad hominem attacks. You know why I lost the case in New York Supreme Court? Because I didn't have enough money to put together an appendix that was stuffed with irrelevant, repetitive documents that were filed in the New York Supreme Court by the defendant Bolger and Defendant Schafer.

I am also a victim here. I really hate using that phrase, but I am not here as some evil Trump-ite trying to get revenge. I just want justice. My rights have been stepped on and I have been called all kinds of names by them.

THE COURT: You are entitled to file a complaint. It is my job to review that complaint to determine whether or not there is legal merit.

MR. HOLLANDER: Understood.

THE COURT: I have ruled on the portions of complaint that I have today. Based upon my ruling, what remains is in essence the possibility of the -- again, I don't believe in my view that you can substantiate a copyright claim. I direct you to go back and look at copyright law based upon whatever additional allegations you think you can put in there because I don't believe there is sufficient basis, other than conclusory allegations, that you could substantiate that the defendants copied anything other than the --

MR. HOLLANDER: The screen shot.

THE COURT: Again, the screen shot doesn't mean they that downloaded any of those documents.

Putting aside the second issue, which is the use or distribution or the like of any of those materials, that claim, the CFAA claim, I will allow to you attempt to amend your complaint.

Let me get back to this point because if the information comes back from that at the time your website was public, I would find it hard to -- not only that it was public in a sense that that is the way it was created and it was a public accessible .net website -- I guess a couple thing. The website that I understand the --

MR. HOLLANDER: ICloud.

THE COURT: -- defendants to have access was the .net website.

MR. HOLLANDER: I just want to clarify that. It is an iCloud and so it has a particular URL but at that point in time it was just a mixture of a lot of different things.

THE COURT: Documents you mean?

MR. HOLLANDER: Which is what you use an iCloud for.

THE COURT: Whatever. It was a place where you stored various documents as I understand what you have been saying.

The issue is whether or not others could access that. In other words, whether members of the public could access it.

MR. HOLLANDER: I want to clarify. On January 3rd -- I am saying on January 3rd, 2015, it was public. There is a Google cache there. Once again my claims are that it was

public at that point because the defendants accessed it and striped the access codes. Now, on January -- when I first learned on January 12th, 2015 that that website was public, I learned about it because I saw Defendant Bolger's affirmation saying she got this media release off of this website. I went back -- I went back to my website and I saw that it was public and I put the access codes right back on. And I think she says in her affidavit that when she tried to access the website -- it might have been January 13th, 2015 -- she couldn't because there were access codes. So it was public for a period of time. The moment I learned about it, which was January 12th, 2015, I put those access codes right back on it.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Your Honor, with the plaintiff admitting that it was public, I don't think there is a good-faith basis for him to even amend now all my other arguments aside. He admitted it was public and the time and he put the codes on after.

MR. HOLLANDER: That's not --

MR. FRANCOEUR: So we know now he is not going to come back with what your Honor is asking for. He just said it was public.

MR. HOLLANDER: I am not admitting that. Give me a break.

THE COURT: If you go back to whatever provider it is, whoever created it, and they basically say, It has always been

public and there were never any security measures on there and there were never any privacy measures on there --

MR. HOLLANDER: I am sorry. I will tell you what they told me back then -- I will go back to them. They are going to say, We have no way of telling. That's what they told me back then. I will go again.

THE COURT: Account opening documents, documents that show when you opened the .net website.

MR. HOLLANDER: I will see if there are any documents.

THE COURT: I don't understand why it wouldn't be like a Facebook where you would have some privacy measures that you would put on there so the people couldn't gain access to it and why they wouldn't be able to tell you that.

MR. HOLLANDER: Well, the access codes were put on there. I am going to go back. I am just trying to be frank with your Honor. I talked to two different people there and they said they had no way — they had no way of telling. If they had been able to tell me, I would have been here with those documents. The documents would have been in the complaint. All I have is what I know I did.

THE COURT: If you documents don't bear out what you believe you are stating was your belief as to what transpired -- because again you concede at a certain point it was public. There were declarations put in the other matter that it was public earlier than the date that has been

indicated. In other words, they downloaded the document from a public website. I am looking for something that will substantiate that. Either documentation from the company that shows that you basically had this storage and that it was something that was not accessible to the public. It may be that if you're correct that they are unable to tell you that, well, then see if you can get some documentation that reflects that.

MR. HOLLANDER: Okay. I will do what I can.

THE COURT: Again, I just want to be clear about this, I dismissed the lion's share of the other claims and if need be I will create additional detail. By that I will read into the record my specific rulings with case citations with regard to each of the other claims that I dismissed here today; but if you persist and these documents and what they show is something — in other words, if the next thing that gets filed is a dismissal of the action, I am going retain jurisdiction to hear from the defendants with regard to whether or not they have an application with regard to whether or not they view this as a frivolous lawsuit. I just want to be clear because I don't want you to be surprised by that.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else that we need to deal with?

How much time do you need, Mr. Hollander?

MR. HOLLANDER: What I will do is I will see if I can

contact this company over the weekend.

THE COURT: Why don't you do this: I will give you two weeks to contact the forensic entity as well as your Internet service provider that you were using at the time that supported .net website that defendants have indicated they obtained the document from.

Obviously, keep in touch with defendants and provide me with a letter -- Ms. Williams two weeks -- asking them how much time they need to get you the materials or to do the work they need to do.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: March 2nd.

THE COURT: March 2nd.

MR. HOLLANDER: I just want to make clear as far as the forensics on the computer whether there is malware there or not, I don't know. He may not find any. He may find some. If he doesn't fine anything, then that is why I put in my first amendment complaint the iCloud or the home computer.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Your Honor, malware is not a claim. There is no malware claim.

MR. HOLLANDER: I think phishing is in there.

THE COURT: No.

MR. FRANCOEUR: There is no claim.

MR. HOLLANDER: Then it depends basically on the

25 | iCloud.

THE COURT: Brute force hacking.

MR. HOLLANDER: They call it cracking. Brute force. It is just on the -- I will contact my host -- the host.

THE COURT: Anything else that we need to deal with today, Mr. Hollander?

MR. HOLLANDER: No.

THE COURT: Once you get the information, speak with your adversary and let them know what the timing is going to be with regard to that and then submit your letter on or before March 2nd.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Your Honor, I know we're all ready to leave, but did I understand you correctly that the plaintiff is going to reach out to the adversary? I thought I was going to reach out to the vendors.

THE COURT: I am sorry. He is going to inform you on how much time he believes the vendors are going to need to do what they need to do.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Sure.

THE COURT: The first time you are hearing it will not be in the letter to me.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: One of two things, either Mr. Hollander has decided not to go forward with that or he has decided to go forward with that and it is going to take a certain amount of time. I just want to you be on the same page that you know how

much time that is going to take.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Very good. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. HOLLANDER: What I am going to do is I am going to contact again my host. I am going to talk to them. Say, You got something you can show that is private or public. I will get a response from them. I will tell him. If it is the response he likes he can put together a motion to have me disbarred and attach all my assets for what they are worth.

THE COURT: The issue, though, is just to be clear, it won't necessarily be sort of — there should be documentation concerning when you created the website. I don't myself have an iCloud. I would imagine that when you initially opened something where you would be storing your documents that there is some indication that only you would have access to it and no one else.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$  HOLLANDER: I will ask them for whatever documents they have.

THE COURT: And with regard to the website itself.

MR. HOLLANDER: The website.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Hollander?

MR. HOLLANDER: No. It was interesting practicing law as long as I did.

THE COURT: To the extent there is going to be a motion, I don't believe they are going to be seeking to have your law license taken away.

MR. HOLLANDER: Of course they will, your Honor. They hate me.

THE COURT: Let's take a step back. I understand the emotions are high. Once you start letting this idea that somehow it is personal, that is when we start going down a slippery slope. You filed a lawsuit. I have made my rulings. You have an opportunity to amend your complaint. I have indicated to you what the consequences could be depending upon what the results of that are and you are continuing to pursue the litigation depending upon what the answers are. I want it to be clear that it is not something that I am making a ruling on one way or another, but I am not precluding the defendants from pursuing that.

MR. HOLLANDER: It was a pleasure appearing before you, your Honor, but it is always personal.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. FRANCOEUR: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: We'll stand adjourned.

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